Law School Wiki

Administrative Law

21 min read

Administrative Law

Course Info

Professor: Merrill (notes attributed throughout) Semester: Fall 2016 Materials: Merrill-drafted notes; Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706); D.C. Circuit and SCOTUS cases

Topics Covered

  • Definition of “agency” under APA § 551; distinction between executive departments and independent commissions
  • Rulemaking vs. adjudication — APA definitions (§ 551(4)–(6)); Londoner-Bi-Metallic distinction
  • Non-delegation doctrine — intelligible principle test; J.W. Hampton through Whitman
  • Legislative veto — INS v. Chadha; Chadha principle; Line Item Veto
  • Appointments Clause — principal vs. inferior officers; Buckley/Freytag/Edmonds/Morrison tests
  • Removal power — Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, Free Enterprise Fund; unitarians vs. functionalists
  • Presidential administration — OIRA, OMB clearance; Kagan’s Presidential Administration; Merrill’s “lacunae”
  • Article III limitations on agency adjudication — Murray’s Lessee, Crowell, Northern Pipeline, Stern v. Marshall
  • Formal rulemaking — APA §§ 556–557; “on the record” magic words; Florida East Coast Railway
  • Informal (notice-and-comment) rulemaking — APA § 553; NPRM, OTC, SBP; Vermont Yankee; logical outgrowth doctrine; Connecticut Light & Power
  • Non-legislative rules — interpretive rules and policy statements; legal effects test; American Mining Congress factors; Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n
  • Good cause exemption from notice-and-comment — APA § 553(b)(B)
  • Informal adjudication — Overton Park hard-look review; contemporaneous record requirement
  • Choice between rulemaking and adjudication — Chenery I & II; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
  • Judicial review of facts — substantial evidence (§ 706(2)(E)); arbitrary-or-capricious (§ 706(2)(A)); ADAPSO
  • Skidmore deference — discretionary weight for agency interpretations lacking force of law
  • Chevron deference — Step Zero (Mead); Step One; Step Two; Brand X; King v. Burwell
  • Auer/Seminole Rock deference — agency interpretations of its own regulations; Christopher v. Smithkline; Perez
  • Hard-look review of agency policy — State Farm; Massachusetts v. EPA; Nova Scotia Food Products
  • Judicial review of agency inaction — Heckler v. Chaney (§ 701(a)(2)); Norton v. SUWA
  • Procedural due process — Londoner/Bi-Metallic threshold; Roth-Sindermann entitlement theory; Mathews v. Eldridge balancing; Goldberg v. Kelly
  • Constitutional standing — Lujan injury-in-fact, causation, redressability; Friends of the Earth; Massachusetts v. EPA special solicitude
  • Zone-of-interests statutory standing — ADAPSO; Lexmark
  • Timing — exhaustion (statutory and equitable; Darby v. Cisneros); finality (Bennett v. Spear); ripeness (Abbott Labs; Toilet Goods)
  • Preclusion of judicial review — express (§ 701(a)(1)); implied (Block v. Community Nutrition); committed to discretion (§ 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney)
  • Sovereign immunity and waiver — APA § 702 (1976 amendment)

Detailed Outline

I. What Is an Agency?

APA § 551(1): “each authority of the Gov’t of the U.S.” excluding Congress and courts. By practice, also excludes the President, EOP, OMB/OIRA, and associated bodies.

Two structural types:

  • Executive departments — single head, dismiss at will (e.g., DoD, Cabinet secretaries)
  • Independent commissions — multi-person head, dismiss for cause, fixed terms (e.g., SEC, FTC)

II. Rulemaking vs. Adjudication

APA definitions:

  • Rule (§ 551(4)) — agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
  • Order (§ 551(6)) — product of adjudication; everything but a rule

Constitutional distinction: Londoner v. Denver (particularized, individual adjudication → due process required; oral hearing) vs. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization (general rule affecting large numbers → due process satisfied by political process; no individual hearing required).

III. Non-Delegation Doctrine

Constitutional basis: Art. I § 1 vests “all legislative Powers” in Congress; Vesting Clause prevents Congress from delegating the power to make the functional equivalent of statutes without an intelligible principle.

Intelligible principle test (J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 1928): Congressional delegation is constitutional so long as Congress provides a guiding standard binding the executive. Each statute poses a problem, a set of solutions, and instructs the executive to make complex factual discretionary findings to decide between them.

Key cases chronologically:

  • Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) — Hot Oil case; no standard for on/off switch → unconstitutional; Cardozo dissent: narrowly canalized
  • Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) — Sick Chicken case; delegation to private trade associations for “fair competition” codes → unconstitutional; businesses “may roam at will”
  • Mistretta v. United States (1989) — Sentencing Commission upheld (3 goals, 4 purposes, 7 case factors, 11 defendant factors); Scalia dissent: “junior varsity Congress”
  • Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (2001) — Scalia: agency cannot cure unlawful delegation by self-limiting; Congress must set the intelligible principle

Modern formula: cite Hampton; cite National Broadcasting/Yakus/American Power & Light as examples of intelligible standards; compare present statute as no less intelligible.

Nondelegation as a canon of construction: courts may narrowly construe a broad delegation rather than strike it (Yakus; Benzene case).

IV. Legislative Veto & Line-Item Veto

INS v. Chadha (1983): Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses bar Congress from reserving to itself (or a subset of itself) a legislative veto over executive action. Fn. 16 — legislative veto is checked only by the authorizing statute. Chadha principle: Congress cannot delegate functional-equivalent-of-statute power to a subset of itself.

Clinton v. City of New York (1998): Line-item veto allowing President to unilaterally repeal parts of statutes also violates Presentment Clause.

V. Appointments Clause

Tiers: (1) Principal officers — appointed by President with Senate advice and consent; (2) Inferior officers — appointed by President, Heads of Departments, or Courts of Law; (3) Employees — not officers.

Officers vs. employees (Buckley/Freytag): Functional test — invested by legal authority with a portion of federal sovereign power that allows binding third parties or the government.

Principal vs. inferior officers (Morrison v. Olson): IC is inferior because (i) removable by AG, (ii) limited duties, (iii) no policymaking powers. Scalia dissent: having a superior is a necessary condition for being an inferior officer.

Edmonds test: Inferior officers are those “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others appointed by Presidential nomination with Senate advice and consent.”

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010): PCAOB members are inferior officers subordinate to SEC (Head of Dept for Appointments Clause purposes).

VI. Removal Power

Myers (1926): President has exclusive unrestricted power to remove purely executive officers he appointed.

Humphrey’s Executor (1935): Limits Myers to “purely executive” officers. FTC’s quasi-legislative/judicial functions → Congress may require for-cause removal. Established the independent agency model.

Morrison v. Olson (1988): Switched to functional approach. Test: does Congress’s restriction on removal impair the President’s exercise of executive power? For-cause removal of IC upheld. Role of IC is definitively executive but restriction does not impair executive function.

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010): Two layers of for-cause removal (SEC → PCAOB) impairs executive function unconstitutionally. CJ. Roberts moves SEC closer to the executive branch. Merrill: independent agencies may have to be located within one of the three branches to be constitutional.

VII. Presidential Administration & OIRA

Elena Kagan’s “Presidential Administration”: Clinton administration transformed agencies from semi-autonomous to presidentially led through self-directed directives and public memos. Normative defense: increased transparency and democratic accountability.

Merrill’s critique (“Lacunae of Presidential Administration”): OIRA operates without APA coverage or statutory authority; exercises substantive cost-benefit and procedural review; not subject to judicial review; gray holes may enable executive aggrandizement.

VIII. Article III Limitations on Agency Adjudication

Historical exceptions to Art. III: territorial courts; military tribunals; public rights (Murray’s Lessee).

Key cases:

  • Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken (1856): Congress cannot withdraw private rights from judicial cognizance; public rights can be withdrawn
  • Crowell v. Benson (1932): Art. III courts must decide all legal/jurisdictional questions; ordinary factual questions may be heard by agency with deferential review
  • Northern Pipeline v. Marathon (1983): Bankruptcy courts cannot exercise full Art. III powers over unrelated tort claims (non-core issues)
  • CFTC v. Schor (1986): Functionalist analysis — de minimis intrusion into Art. III for particularized area, permissive, Art. III enforcement
  • Stern v. Marshall (2011): CJ. Roberts revives formal categories; bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter final judgment on state-law counterclaim

IX. Formal Rulemaking (APA §§ 556–557)

United States v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973): Default is informal rulemaking. Trigger for formal rulemaking under APA § 553(c): enabling act must require rulemaking “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” — the “magic words.” “After hearing” alone is insufficient (Allegheny Ludlum).

§ 556(d): ALJ may dispense with oral presentations and cross-examination where a party will not be prejudiced.

§ 557: ALJ recommends → agency makes final decision; appeal on the record with proposed findings of fact.

X. Informal (Notice-and-Comment) Rulemaking (APA § 553)

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC (1978): APA § 553 establishes the maximum procedural requirements courts may impose on agencies in rulemaking. Courts may not impose additional hybrid rulemaking procedures (no “Monday morning quarterbacking”). Corollaries: (1) courts cannot go beyond § 553 or the organic act; (2) courts must review outcomes, not the procedure by which outcomes were reached.

Three-part informal rulemaking under § 553:

  1. NPRM (§ 553(b)) — must state legal authority, time/place, and either text or description of subject matter. AG’s Manual: “sufficiently informative to assure interested persons an opportunity to participate intelligently.”
  2. Opportunity to Comment (OTC) (§ 553(c)) — written comments; occasionally oral.
  3. Statement of Basis and Purpose (SBP) (§ 553(c)) — must respond to comments that, if true, would require a change in the proposed rule. American Mining Congress v. MSHA / American Mining Congress v. EPA.

Logical outgrowth doctrine: Final rule must be sufficiently anticipated by NPRM to allow meaningful comment. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC (D.C. Cir. 1982): exemption procedure in a more stringent final rule saved the rule from logical outgrowth challenge.

Nova Scotia Food Products requirements: Agency must disclose technical data in NPRM and explain why rule applies uniformly to a large and diverse class; failure invalidates the rule. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp

Exemptions from § 553:

  • Subject matter (§ 553(a)): military/foreign affairs, internal personnel, grants, benefits, contracts
  • Procedural rules (§ 553(b)(A))
  • Good cause (§ 553(b)(B)): notice and procedure are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”

XI. Non-Legislative Rules

An interpretive rule sets out the agency’s understanding of governing law; a policy statement sets out enforcement priorities. Neither goes through § 553 notice-and-comment.

Legal effects test (Pacific Gas & Electric): If agency uses a rule as binding law in subsequent adjudications, it is legislative. Applied ex ante on the face of the rule.

American Mining Congress v. MSHA (D.C. Cir. 1993): Three-part test for when a rule is legislative:

  1. Rule is necessary predicate for an enforcement action
  2. Agency labels it as legislative by printing it in the C.F.R.
  3. Rule is an amendment of a prior legislative rule

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n (2015): D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine (requiring N&C before revising interpretive rules) violates Vermont Yankee. Auer deference does not automatically convert interpretive rules into binding law.

Anti-evasion principle: Agency should not label a rule interpretive or a policy statement merely to evade N&C.

XII. Informal Adjudication

Overton Park (1971): Courts review informal adjudication under arbitrary-or-capricious standard (§ 706(2)(A)) with “searching and careful” review but may not substitute their judgment for the agency’s. Agency must provide a contemporaneous administrative record; no post hoc rationalizations. PBGC v. LTV: 706 requires review on the “whole record.”

XIII. Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication

Chenery I: Agency decisions can be sustained only on the grounds actually relied on at the time of decision. Power delegated to agency, not its lawyers’ arguments.

Chenery II: Choice between proceeding by general rule or individual adjudication lies in the “informed discretion of the agency.” Agencies may “announce new principles” through adjudication (NLRB v. Bell Aerospace). Retroactivity is a balance — harm of new rule vs. mischief of contrary result.

XIV. Judicial Review of Facts

Substantial evidence standard (§ 706(2)(E)) — formal proceedings: depends on congressional intent for more searching review than jury standard; whole record; ALJ’s credibility findings given weight. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB (1951).

Arbitrary-or-capricious standard (§ 706(2)(A)) — informal proceedings: ADAPSO (D.C. Cir. 1984): substantial evidence is “only a specific application” of the A&C standard. An administrative finding that is not A&C “must necessarily be supported by evidence in the record.”

XV. Skidmore Deference

Skidmore Deference: Agency interprets its enabling act in pursuance of “official duty” and with “specialized experience.” Weight depends on thoroughness, validity of reasoning, consistency with prior pronouncements, and persuasive force. Applies where agency lacks force-of-law authority (Christensen; Mead fallback). Applies even when agency does not have formal responsibility for administering the statute but has relevant expertise.

XVI. Chevron Deference

Chevron Deference — Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984): Interpretive gap in an enabling act, without more, entitles the agency to deference.

Step Zero (Mead): Did agency act with force of law — via formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking? If not, fall back to Skidmore. United States v. Mead Corp. (2001): tariff classifications issued by customs offices insufficient; Chevron requires meaningful participation opportunity and reasoned decision-making. City of Arlington v. FCC (2013): No categorical distinction between “jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” agency interpretations; Chevron applies to both. CJ. Roberts dissent: jurisdictional issues should be reviewed de novo.

Step One: Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? Use traditional tools of statutory interpretation. De novo review. If clear — apply it. If ambiguous — go to Step Two.

Step Two: Is the agency’s interpretation based on a permissible (reasonable) construction of the statute? Agency need not choose the best interpretation, only a reasonable one.

King v. Burwell (2015): “Too big for Chevron” exception — when a question of deep economic and political significance is at stake, courts may not presume Congress implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency.

National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X (2005): A court’s prior construction of a statute trumps agency construction only if the court held that interpretation follows from the statute’s unambiguous terms and leaves no room for agency discretion.

Hard-look review overlapping Step Two: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983): Rescission of passive restraint rule was arbitrary and capricious under § 706(2)(A) because agency failed to consider all relevant alternatives, reversed course without adequate explanation. “Swerve doctrine” — deregulation requires the same justification as regulation.

Massachusetts v. EPA (2007): Denial of petition for rulemaking reviewed under Chevron Step One (§ 202(a)(1) has clear meaning → no deference at Step One); EPA must either make an endangerment finding or provide scientifically sufficient reasons for not doing so. States have special solicitude in standing analysis.

XVII. Auer/Seminole Rock Deference

Auer Deference: If agency’s regulation is ambiguous, agency’s interpretation of its own regulation has “controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Agency expertise in enforcement provides unique interpretive insight.

Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham (2012): Auer may be overridden when (1) interpretation does not reflect fair and considered judgment, (2) conflicts with prior interpretation, (3) is merely a convenient litigating position, or (4) is a post hoc rationalization.

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n (2015): Auer deference does not automatically make interpretive rules legally binding.

Scalia’s separation-of-powers critique: Agency that writes a vague regulation and then interprets it gets all three governmental powers.

XVIII. Non-Enforcement / Committed to Discretion

Heckler v. Chaney (1985): Agency’s decision not to pursue enforcement is presumptively unreviewable under § 701(a)(2) — committed to agency discretion by law. When enabling act is “drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” it is impossible to evaluate for “abuse of discretion.” Presumption is rebutted where enabling act provides guidelines the agency must follow in exercising enforcement powers (e.g., mandatory language — Dunlop v. Bachowski).

Norton v. SUWA (2004): § 706(1) claims (to compel agency action unlawfully withheld) can proceed only where plaintiff asserts failure to take a discrete agency action that the agency is legally required to take.

XIX. Procedural Due Process

Threshold — what interests trigger due process?

  • Londoner/Bi-Metallic distinction (see Section II above)
  • Roth-Sindermann entitlement theory: property comes from sub-constitutional (usually state) law; liberty comes from substantive due process decisional law; both must be more than a mere expectancy (“legitimate claim of entitlement”)
  • Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) — welfare benefits = property; pre-termination hearing required (“high water mark” of due process)

Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test (three factors):

  1. Private interest affected by official action
  2. Risk of erroneous deprivation through procedures used + probable value of additional safeguards
  3. Government’s interest including fiscal and administrative burdens

Mathews distinguished from Goldberg: private interest in SSDI is not “brutal need”; evidence is documentary and medical rather than credibility-dependent → paper hearing suffices; government interest in administrative efficiency weighs heavily.

Three packages of procedures courts impose: (1) full adjudicatory hearing — rarely; (2) Goss hearing — notice + oral opportunity to be heard; (3) paper hearing — documentary evidence.

XX. Constitutional Standing

Three-part test (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 1992):

  1. Injury in fact — concrete, particularized, actual or imminent (not “someday” intentions; plane-ticket rule)
  2. Causation — fairly traceable to challenged action (third-party causation problem — Simon)
  3. Redressability — likely to be redressed by favorable decision

Massachusetts v. EPA (2007): States have “special solicitude” in standing analysis when ceding police power regulatory authority to the federal sovereign. Loss of coastal territory = concrete injury.

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw (2000): Injury to plaintiff (fear of using polluted river), not injury to environment, secures standing. Civil penalties paid to government can deter future violations → redress plaintiff’s injury.

XXI. Zone-of-Interests Statutory Standing

APA § 702: Person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” ADAPSO (1970): “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.” Largely redundant of injury-in-fact. Lexmark (2014): limits zone-of-interests to residual § 704 causes of action; applies proximate cause analysis.

XXII. Timing

Exhaustion: Statutory (must raise all arguments before agency before court; FERC model — must raise on rehearing or waive); equitable (McCarthy v. Madigan — exceptions: undue prejudice, futility, bias, inadequacy of remedy). Darby v. Cisneros (1993): APA § 704 — no common-law exhaustion in APA cases unless statute expressly requires or agency rule makes decision inoperative during appeal.

Finality: Bennett v. Spear two-part test: (1) culmination of agency’s decision-making process; (2) rights or obligations determined or legal consequences flow. Initiation of complaint is not final (FTC v. Standard Oil/Socal). Compliance order with enhanced penalty exposure is final (Sackett).

Ripeness: Abbott Labs (1967): pre-enforcement review if (1) issue is purely legal and fit for decision, and (2) hardship to parties of withholding review. Toilet Goods (1967): access to manufacturing facilities — issue not fit (highly fact-specific) and no significant hardship to withhold.

XXIII. Preclusion of Judicial Review

Express preclusion (§ 701(a)(1)): APA embodies presumption of judicial review overridden only by “clear and convincing evidence” of contrary congressional intent (Abbott Labs). Statutory language precluding “decisions” construed not to bar constitutional challenges (Johnson v. Robison).

Implied preclusion: Block v. Community Nutrition (1984): enabling act providing review to producers and handlers impliedly precluded consumer challenges (expressio unius; structural inference — scheme created a cartel against consumer interests).

Committed to agency discretion (§ 701(a)(2)): “No law to apply” standard (Overton Park). Categories: decisions not to enforce (Heckler v. Chaney); traditionally discretionary actions (ICC v. Locomotive Engineers); national security (Webster v. Doe); lump-sum appropriations (Lincoln v. Vigil). Constitutional challenges are not precluded (Webster v. Doe).

Key Doctrines

Key Cases

Exam Approach

1. Agency Authority

Is there a valid statutory delegation? Does the agency’s action exceed its statutory mandate (non-delegation, ultra vires)? Is the delegation constitutional under the intelligible principle test?

2. Rulemaking vs. Adjudication

Apply APA § 551 definitions. Use Londoner-Bi-Metallic to determine if due process attaches. Determine if agency is making a rule (future effect, general applicability) or an order (everything else).

3. Procedural Validity

Legislative rule (§ 553):

  • Was NPRM adequate? Did it provide sufficient description of the proposed rule?
  • Did NPRM disclose technical data relied upon (Nova Scotia Food Products / Portland Cement)?
  • Is the final rule a logical outgrowth of the NPRM?
  • Did the SBP respond to significant comments?
  • Check for subject matter and good cause exemptions (§ 553(a); § 553(b)(A)–(B))

Formal rulemaking: Did the organic act use the “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” magic words? (United States v. Florida East Coast Railway). Default is informal.

Non-legislative rule: Apply legal effects test (Pacific Gas & Electric) and American Mining Congress v. MSHA three-part test. Is this an amendment of a prior legislative rule (Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n)?

4. Appointments and Removal

  • Is the individual an officer or employee? (Buckley/Freytag functional test)
  • If officer: principal or inferior? (Morrison/Edmonds — supervision by Senate-confirmed superior)
  • Properly appointed through the correct path (President, Head of Dept, Court of Law)?
  • Any unconstitutional removal restriction? (Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB — two layers of for-cause removal)

5. Deference

Step Zero (Mead): Did the agency act with force of law — formal adjudication or N&C rulemaking? If not → Skidmore.

Step One (Chevron): Has Congress directly spoken? Apply traditional tools: text, structure, history, canons. If clear → apply it.

Step Two: Is the agency’s interpretation reasonable? Apply hard-look / State Farm analysis as a process overlay.

Interpretive rule / policy statement: Skidmore deference (thoroughness, validity, consistency).

Agency interprets its own ambiguous regulation: Auer Deference, unless Christopher exceptions apply (no fair and considered judgment; litigating position; post hoc rationalization; conflict with prior interpretation).

King v. Burwell exception: Question of major economic and political significance → no presumed implicit delegation; court decides de novo at Step One.

6. Arbitrary and Capricious Review (§ 706(2)(A))

Did agency:

  • Consider all relevant factors?
  • Ignore important aspects of the problem?
  • Offer a reasoned explanation consistent with Chenery I (cannot sustain on grounds not relied on by agency)?
  • Explain departures from prior positions (“swerve doctrine” — State Farm)?
  • Consider all reasonable alternatives (State Farm — airbags; detachable belts)?

7. Standing (Constitutional)

  • Injury in fact: Concrete, particularized, actual or imminent? (not “someday” intentions — Lujan; plane-ticket rule)
  • Causation: Fairly traceable to challenged conduct? (third-party causation problem — Simon)
  • Redressability: Likely redressed by favorable decision?
  • Special solicitude: Is plaintiff a State? (Massachusetts v. EPA)

8. Zone-of-Interests (APA Statutory Standing under § 702)

Is the interest arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the organic statute? (ADAPSO). Lexmark: proximate cause overlay.

9. Timing

  • Exhaustion: Statutory vs. equitable? Darby v. Cisneros APA rule (no added common-law exhaustion unless statute or rule requires). Equitable exceptions: prejudice, futility, bias.
  • Finality: Bennett v. Spear — culmination of process + legal consequences?
  • Ripeness: Abbott Labs — purely legal + fit for judicial decision + hardship to parties?

10. Preclusion of Review

11. Procedural Due Process

  • Step 1 — Threshold interest: Property (entitlement from positive law under Roth-Sindermann) or liberty (substantive due process decisional law)? Distinguish mere expectancy from legitimate entitlement. Londoner/Bi-Metallic: is this a rule (many affected, political process suffices) or adjudication (few, individual grounds → due process)?
  • Step 2 — Mathews balancing: Private interest + risk of error + probable value of additional procedures vs. government’s fiscal and administrative burden.
  • Package of procedures required: Full adjudicatory hearing (rarely); Goss hearing (notice + oral opportunity); paper hearing (documentary medical evidence).

Graph View

Backlinks