Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States

Citation: 295 U.S. 495 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1935)

Facts

Title I of the NIRA authorized the President to approve “codes of fair competition” drafted by industry groups, which would then have the force of law. The Live Poultry Code established wages, hours, and trade practices for the New York poultry industry. The Schechter brothers were convicted of violating the code’s provisions. They challenged the NIRA as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private industry groups and the President alike.

Issue

Does Title I of the NIRA unconstitutionally delegate legislative power by authorizing the President to approve privately drafted industry codes of fair competition without providing an intelligible principle or sufficient standards?

Holding

The Supreme Court unanimously struck down Title I of the NIRA. The phrase “fair competition” was too vague and undefined to constitute an intelligible principle. Moreover, the delegation to private groups to draft the codes — which then became law upon presidential approval — represented an extraordinary cession of legislative power without any meaningful congressional guidance.

Rule

Congress may not delegate legislative power to private parties or to the executive without establishing clear standards and policies. A bare standard of “fair competition” is insufficient to constitute an intelligible principle capable of cabining executive discretion.

Significance

Schechter Poultry (the “sick chicken case”) is one of the two cases that actually struck down a federal statute under the non-delegation doctrine, and the most famous of the pair. It is routinely paired with Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan to illustrate what an invalid delegation looks like. The case is also significant in Commerce Clause doctrine, as the Court held that the poultry had come to rest in New York and was no longer “in” interstate commerce. Schechter represents the high-water mark of the non-delegation doctrine and is often invoked in modern debates about whether the Court should revive stricter delegation limits.

Covered In