Non-Delegation Doctrine

Rule

Congress may not delegate its core legislative power to another branch or private entity. A grant of rulemaking authority to an executive agency is constitutional only if Congress provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency’s exercise of the delegated power. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928).

Elements / Test

  1. Identify the statute and the power purportedly delegated.
  2. Ask whether Congress has laid down an intelligible principle: a standard, purpose, or set of factors that guides the agency and limits its discretion.
  3. Apply the modern formula: cite precedents in which similarly (or less) specific standards were upheld (National Broadcasting, Yakus, American Power & Light); compare the present case; conclude the delegation is constitutional.
  4. If no intelligible principle exists (Panama Refining; Schechter Poultry), the delegation is unconstitutional.

Exceptions

  • Agency may use a narrowing construction to constrain its own discretion, but this does not retroactively cure an unconstitutional delegation at the time of enactment (Whitman v. American Trucking Associations).
  • Conditional delegation (contingency clause): Congress may condition reinstating a rule on the President’s factual finding. Cargo of the Brig Aurora (1813).
  • “Good year” exception: The doctrine has only struck down statutes in 1935 (Panama Refining, Schechter Poultry).

Policy

  • Ensures democratic accountability: Congress, as the elected branch, must make fundamental policy choices.
  • Prevents the executive from wielding unchecked legislative power.
  • Counterarguments: modern regulatory complexity may require agencies with technical expertise to fill in details; intelligible principle standard is broad enough to uphold virtually any delegation since 1935.

Key Cases

Covered In