Mistretta v. United States
Citation: 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
Facts
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent body within the judicial branch, with authority to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines. Mistretta challenged this arrangement as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and a violation of separation of powers.
Issue
Is the creation of the Sentencing Commission — an independent body in the judicial branch with rulemaking authority over criminal sentencing — constitutional?
Holding
Yes. The creation of the Sentencing Commission does not violate either the non-delegation doctrine or separation of powers. Congress provided sufficient standards (intelligible principle), and placing the Commission in the judicial branch does not unduly expand or contract any branch’s power.
Rule
Non-delegation: Congress may delegate authority to independent commissions within another branch of government if it provides an intelligible principle guiding the commission’s discretion. The guidelines need not be infinitely specific; Congress provided detailed sentencing factors and policy objectives.
Separation of powers: The Constitution’s structural protections prohibit one branch from aggrandizing itself at another’s expense, but do not prohibit Congress from assigning hybrid functions to bodies that share characteristics of multiple branches.
Significance
- Major case sustaining the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (later made advisory by United States v. Booker, 2005)
- Scalia dissented, arguing the Commission was an unconstitutional “junior-varsity Congress” — a rulemaking body without clear constitutional home
- Illustrates the breadth of permissible delegation under the modern intelligible principle test