Chevron Deference
Rule
When Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to administer a statute, and the agency has interpreted an ambiguous provision of that statute through a proceeding with the force of law, courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is a permissible (reasonable) construction of the statute. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC (1984).
Elements / Test
Step Zero (Mead threshold): Did Congress delegate interpretive authority to the agency, and did the agency act with the force of law (formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking)? If not, Skidmore deference applies.
- Special exceptions: multiple agencies administering the same statute (Rapaport); “too big a question” for implicit delegation (King v. Burwell; FDA v. Brown & Williamson).
Step One: Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? Using the traditional tools of statutory interpretation (text, structure, legislative history, purpose), is the statute clear? If so, the statute governs — no deference.
Step Two: Is the agency’s interpretation based on a permissible (reasonable) construction of the statute? Even if not the best reading, the court defers if the interpretation is reasonable.
Exceptions
- Interpretive rules, policy statements, enforcement guidelines: no Chevron deference (Christensen v. Harris County; Mead). Fallback to Skidmore.
- Agency interpretation of its own jurisdiction: debated — City of Arlington v. FCC holds no jurisdictional carve-out; Roberts dissent requires de novo review of jurisdictional questions.
- Judicial precedent: A prior court decision holding a statute unambiguous forecloses Chevron (Brand X). But if prior court did not find the statute “unambiguous,” agency may adopt a different interpretation.
Policy
- Reflects congressional delegation of policy choices to politically accountable executive agencies with technical expertise.
- Creates uncertainty about the role of courts in statutory interpretation (tension with APA § 706’s “decide all relevant questions of law”).
- Under attack: J. Thomas (Michigan v. EPA) argues Chevron violates separation of powers by vesting judicial power in the executive.
Key Cases
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council — foundational two-step framework
- United States v. Mead Corp. — force-of-law requirement (Step Zero)
- King v. Burwell — “too big a question” exception; ACA subsidies
- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp — major questions doctrine predecessor
- City of Arlington v. FCC — no jurisdictional exception to Chevron
- National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X — judicial precedent and Chevron