Heckler v. Chaney
Citation: 470 U.S. 821 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1985)
Facts
Death row inmates petitioned the FDA to take enforcement action against the use of drugs in lethal injection executions, arguing the drugs had not been approved for that use under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The FDA refused to act, exercising its enforcement discretion. The inmates sought judicial review of the FDA’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings.
Issue
Is an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action presumptively unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2) as an action “committed to agency discretion by law”?
Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously held that an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is presumptively unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2). Such decisions are akin to a prosecutor’s discretion not to indict and involve complex judgments about priorities, resources, and strategy that are ill-suited to judicial review.
Rule
Agency decisions not to take enforcement action are presumptively committed to agency discretion by law and therefore unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2). This presumption may be rebutted if a statute meaningfully constrains the agency’s enforcement discretion (i.e., provides meaningful standards against which to measure the agency’s refusal to act). The presumption applies most strongly to complete refusals to initiate enforcement proceedings.
Significance
Heckler v. Chaney establishes the most important exception to the general presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action. It draws a fundamental asymmetry in administrative law: while agency action (rules, adjudications, enforcement decisions) is generally reviewable under the APA, agency inaction is presumptively unreviewable. The case is essential for understanding the scope of APA § 701(a)(2) and is contrasted with cases in which Congress has given agencies specific mandatory duties (which are reviewable) versus open-ended enforcement discretion (which is not).