Constitutional Law
Course Info
Professor: Unknown Semester: Fall 2015 Source: Conlaw_FL15.txt
Topics Covered
- Judicial review and constitutional interpretation (Marbury; Cooper v. Aaron)
- Justiciability: standing, ripeness, mootness, political question doctrine
- Federalism: enumerated powers, necessary and proper clause (McCulloch)
- Commerce Clause: historical evolution, Lopez three-category test, Raich, NFIB v. Sebelius
- Taxing and Spending power (Dole, Sebelius)
- Tenth Amendment: commandeering, anti-commandeering (Printz, New York v. US)
- Dormant Commerce Clause
- Separation of powers: Steel Seizure (Jackson tripartite), INS v. Chadha, appointment and removal
- Individual Rights: Lochner era and its legacy, rational basis review
- Equal Protection: race (Brown, Korematsu, Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights), affirmative action, sex/gender, sexual orientation, animus principle
- Substantive Due Process: unenumerated rights, incorporation
- First Amendment: free speech (Brandenburg, Citizens United), free exercise (Smith, Hobby Lobby), establishment (Lemon test)
- Second Amendment and incorporation
Detailed Outline
I. Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation
Marbury v. Madison: Establishes judicial review of Acts of Congress.
- Art. III §2 extends to all cases arising under the Constitution
- Judiciary Act of 1789 §13 adds writs of mandamus to original jurisdiction → unconstitutional
- “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”
Scope of Judicial Review:
- Federal courts supreme in exposition of federal law (Cooper v. Aaron)
- Review of state court judgments: S. Ct. has appellate jurisdiction (Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee)
- Certain matters require uniform national legislation; states are incompetent to handle them inconsistently
Constitutional Interpretation Methods:
- Originalism: intent, meaning/understanding
- Textualism: plain text
- Purposivism: purpose behind provision
- Living constitutionalism / dynamic interpretation
- “We must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding” (Marshall in McCulloch)
Political Question Doctrine:
- Textual commitment to another branch (e.g., Senate has “sole power to try impeachments” — Nixon v. US)
- Lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards (Baker v. Carr)
- Justiciable: legislative malapportionment (Baker), one-person one-vote (Reynolds v. Sims)
- Non-justiciable: impeachment of judges, guarantee clause, validity of amendments
II. Justiciability
Standing (Constitutional — Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife):
- Plaintiff personally suffered injury (concrete, particularized, actual or imminent)
- Causation: injury caused by defendant’s acts
- Redressability: favorable decision would remedy the injury
Prudential Limits (Congress can remove):
- No third-party standing generally (Craig v. Boren exception)
- Taxpayer standing insufficient unless Flast test met (direct expenditure under Taxing/Spending Clause)
Ripeness: Must be harm or immediate threat of harm; state law generally can’t be challenged before enforcement.
Mootness: Controversy must exist at all stages of litigation.
No Advisory Opinions: Requires actual dispute + substantial likelihood of relief.
III. Federalism — Enumerated Powers
Necessary and Proper Clause (McCulloch v. Maryland):
- Broad implied powers: “necessary” means useful/convenient, not “absolutely necessary”
- Gov’t cannot use implied powers as pretext for great independent powers (taxing, foreign affairs)
- Two faces: (1) deference to Congress; (2) court reserves power to invalidate if rights infringed
Historical Evolution of Commerce Clause:
- Gibbons v. Ogden: “commerce” = virtually every activity affecting more than one state; “regulation” = plenary power; includes intrastate parts of larger interstate enterprise
- Formalist era: manufacturing/mining/agriculture = intrastate commerce (Hammer v. Dagenhart — overruled)
- New Deal: overrule Dagenhart; rational basis review (Darby Lumber)
Lopez Three-Category Test (United States v. Lopez; United States v. Morrison):
- Channels: roads, rivers, train tracks, airspace
- Instrumentalities: people, machines, automobiles that pass through channels
- (Intrastate) activity substantially affecting interstate commerce — must be economic activity; jurisdictional element helps (converts substantial effects into instrumentalities)
Gonzales v. Raich: Regulating local medicinal marijuana upheld under Commerce Clause; aggregate effect of all intrastate homegrown marijuana substantially affects the interstate market (applying Wickard v. Filburn).
NFIB v. Sebelius (ACA Individual Mandate):
- Commerce Clause cannot compel inactivity into activity (“calling into commerce”)
- Mandate survived as a tax: revenue-generating purpose, collected by IRS, no scienter, no criminal sanctions, amount is a penalty less than price of insurance
- Medicaid expansion: spending condition coercive when threatening all existing Medicaid funding
National Solutions Test (implicit in Lopez/Morrison):
- Is there a national problem requiring collective solution?
- Are states separately incompetent (e.g., regulatory arbitrage)?
IV. Taxing and Spending
What is a Tax? (Sebelius/Sonzhinsky):
- Revenue-generating purpose
- Does not virtually prohibit activity; dampen it (pigovian tax)
- No scienter requirement; no criminal sanctions
- Clear statement it is a tax (collected by IRS, congressional intent)
Spending Power Limits (South Dakota v. Dole; Sebelius):
- Must be for general welfare
- Conditions must be unambiguous
- Conditions must be germane to federal interests
- Conditions must not be coercive (Sebelius — all-or-nothing Medicaid = coercion)
- Conditions must not violate independent constitutional rights
- Congress can do through conditions what it could not do directly (Dole — drinking age via highway funds)
Treaty Power (Missouri v. Holland):
- Self-executing vs. non-self-executing treaties
- Can implement beyond Art. I §8 powers, but not beyond the Constitution (Reid v. Covert)
- Must involve international problem, not purely domestic (Bond v. United States)
V. Tenth Amendment and Anti-Commandeering
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan: Courts cannot draw the line between state/federal powers; federal political process protects states’ interests (partially overrules National League Cities).
- Federal government cannot commandeer state officials to enforce federal law (Printz v. United States)
- Federal government may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program (New York v. United States)
- But: if legitimate use of federal power (taxing, spending, commerce) that incentivizes (not commandeers) state action → constitutional (Dole)
Issues with commandeering: blurs accountability, burdens states financially, increases federal power, robs President of power to enforce laws.
VI. Dormant Commerce Clause
Core principle: Even without federal legislation, states cannot discriminate against interstate commerce.
- State has police power to regulate for local needs but not to engage in economic protectionism (Philadelphia v. New Jersey)
- Facially neutral tax + in-state subsidy = functional tariff, invalid (West Lynn Creamery v. Healy)
- States can regulate intrastate aspects of interstate commerce if subject requires local accommodation (Cooley v. Board of Wardens)
VII. Separation of Powers
Jackson’s Tripartite Framework (Steel Seizure / Youngstown Sheet & Tube):
- President + express/implied authority from Congress → maximum power
- President + absence of congressional action → acts on independent authority (foreign affairs, executive agreements)
- President + disapproval of Congress → only constitutional powers (least power; highly suspect)
Foreign Affairs and War:
- Congressional power to make war; President can authorize military action (War Powers Resolution: report within 48 hours, 60-day authorization limit)
- Vesting clause + “receive ambassadors” → President’s exclusive power to recognize sovereigns (Zivotofsky v. Kerry)
- Detainees: Writ of Habeas Corpus survives at Guantanamo (Boumediene v. Bush — de facto jurisdiction)
Procedural Requirements for Legislation:
- One-house legislative veto violates bicameralism and presentment (INS v. Chadha)
- Line-item veto = unilateral power to change text of duly enacted statute — unconstitutional (Clinton v. New York)
- Non-delegation doctrine: Congress must give intelligible principle for agency lawmaking (largely toothless today)
Appointment and Removal:
- Congress cannot appoint officers to agencies (Buckley)
- If officer performs purely executive functions → removable at will by President (Myers, Bowsher)
- Officers of independent agencies with quasi-legislative/judicial powers → removal limited to good cause (Humphrey’s Executor)
- Independent counsel → good cause removal by AG upheld (Morrison v. Olson)
- Two layers of good cause removal = too difficult, interferes with removal powers (PCAOB)
- Recess appointments: require recess of more than 3 days (NLRB v. Canning)
VIII. Individual Rights — Historical Development
Bill of Rights originally applied only against federal government (Barron v. Mayor & City of Baltimore).
Slaughterhouse Cases: Privileges or Immunities Clause of 14th Amendment narrowly construed — protects only privileges of national citizenship, not state citizenship; did not protect general civil rights against states.
Lochner Era:
- Substantive due process used to invalidate economic regulation: liberty of contract in 14th Amendment (Lochner v. New York)
- Presumption against state economic regulation
- J. Holmes dissent: “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics”
- Pulled back by: West Coast Hotel (no freedom of contract in Constitution); Nebbia (rational relation to legislative purpose suffices)
- Carolene Products fn. 4: Lesser presumption of constitutionality when:
- Legislation violates specific Bill of Rights/14th Amendment prohibition
- Legislation restricts ordinary political processes (voting, speech, association)
- Legislation directed at discrete and insular minorities
Modern Legacy: Extreme deference in economic regulation (rational basis); robust review in enumerated rights and minority protection.
IX. Equal Protection
Levels of Scrutiny:
- Strict scrutiny (race, national origin): narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest
- Intermediate scrutiny (sex/gender, illegitimacy): substantially related to an important governmental objective
- Rational basis (economic, social regulation): rationally related to a legitimate state interest
Rational Basis Review
- Very forgiving; almost everything passes (Railway Express, Williamson v. Lee Optical)
- Over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness both OK
- Post-hoc rationale sufficient
Race and Equal Protection
Brown I (1954): De jure segregation in public schools violates Equal Protection.
- Racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny
- Historical purpose of 14th Amendment; Carolene Products fn. 4 rationale; changed importance of education
Brown II: “All deliberate speed” → later: integration must be implemented now (Green v. County School Board)
Key Distinctions:
- Brown attacks de jure segregation, not de facto (structural) segregation
- Parents Involved: Once segregation remedied, subsequent segregation = private choices; no duty to remedy
Facial Neutrality and Discriminatory Impact:
- Facially neutral law administered discriminatorily violates EPC (Yick Wo v. Hopkins)
- Discriminatory impact alone is insufficient for strict scrutiny (Washington v. Davis)
- Prove discriminatory intent by: (1) overwhelming disparate impact; (2) historical background; (3) sequence of events; (4) legislative history (Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing)
Affirmative Action:
- Race-conscious admissions: compelling interest = diverse student body; plus-factor OK, not quota (Bakke)
- Strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications (Croson)
- Narrow tailoring: compelling interest; individualized review; no quota system (Grutter/Gratz)
- Diversity in education = compelling interest, but narrow tailoring requires close analysis (Fisher v. UT)
Korematsu v. US (1944): Japanese internment upheld in wartime — demonstrates limits of strict scrutiny under military deference; teaches that courts may fail to protect minorities in exigent circumstances.
Reverse incorporation: 5th Amendment Due Process = Equal Protection against federal government (Bolling v. Sharpe).
Sex and Gender
- Intermediate scrutiny: classifications must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achieving them (Craig v. Boren)
- “Exceedingly persuasive justification” required for gender-based classifications, approaching strict scrutiny (US v. Virginia — VMI)
- Pregnancy = not sex discrimination (Geduldig v. Aiello); Congress used Title VII to fix this
- Sex stereotypes → heightened intermediate scrutiny
Sexual Orientation
- Not a formally recognized suspect class (though see Windsor, Obergefell)
- DOMA struck down under 5th Amendment DPC + EPC animus rationale (US v. Windsor)
- Animus principle: law whose “sheer breadth” can only be explained by hostility to a politically unpopular group fails rational basis (Romer v. Evans — Amendment 2)
Rational Basis with Teeth (“Anti-Animus Principle”):
- Statutes motivated by bare desire to harm an identifiable group fail even rational basis
- Moreno (hippies / food stamps), Cleburne (group homes for disabled), Romer (Amendment 2), Windsor (DOMA)
X. Substantive Due Process (Modern)
Modern Doctrine (post-Lochner):
- Applies robustly in: marriage (Loving), abortion, intimate family decisions, certain fundamental rights
- Fundamental rights analysis: “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
- Not applied to economic regulation (rational basis after West Coast Hotel/Nebbia)
Incorporation of Bill of Rights against States (via 14th Amendment DPC):
- Mechanism: Due Process Clause (Privileges or Immunities dead after Slaughterhouse)
- Selective incorporation: nearly all Bill of Rights provisions incorporated “jot for jot”
- Not incorporated: 3rd Amendment, 7th Amendment, 5th Amendment Grand Jury component (Hurtado), 6th Amendment unanimous verdict requirement (Apodaca)
XI. First Amendment
Free Speech
Evolution:
- “Clear and present danger” test (Schenck)
- J. Brandeis: danger must be imminent and serious to justify suppression (Whitney)
- Modern Brandenburg test: Speech not protected only if speaker intends to incite violation of law that is both imminent and likely (Brandenburg v. Ohio)
Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral:
- Restricting speech based on content → strict scrutiny
- Restricting speech on time, manner, place (content-neutral) → intermediate scrutiny
- Targeting expressive conduct for its expression → strict scrutiny (Texas v. Johnson)
- Targeting non-expressive conduct with incidental effects on speech → relaxed intermediate scrutiny (US v. O’Brien)
Exceptions: obscenity; defamation (actual malice for public figures — NY Times v. Sullivan); fighting words (but must be content-neutral — RAV v. City of St. Paul)
Campaign Finance:
- Buckley v. Valeo: Limits on contributions → intermediate-ish scrutiny (symbolic expression + anti-corruption interest); limits on expenditures → strict scrutiny (direct speech)
- Citizens United v. FEC: Corporate independent expenditures protected under First Amendment; overrules Austin; anti-distortion interest not compelling
Establishment of Religion
Lemon Test (Lemon v. Kurtzman):
- Statute has secular (not predominantly religious) purpose
- Primary effect does not advance/inhibit religion
- No excessive entanglement between government and religion
Endorsement Test: Does government appear to take a position on religion making non-favored feel denigrated? (Allegheny County v. ACLU)
Coercion Test: Psychological coercion to participate in religion violates Establishment Clause (Lee v. Weisman — graduation prayer)
Ceremonial deism: “Under God” in Pledge of Allegiance = ceremonial, not religious endorsement.
Historical practice exception: Long-standing practice (e.g., legislative chaplains since 1791) presumptively constitutional (Marsh v. Chambers).
Free Exercise of Religion
- Sherbert v. Verner: Established strict scrutiny for free exercise (overruled for neutral laws)
- Employment Division v. Smith (1990): Neutral laws of general applicability do not violate 1st Amendment, even if they burden religious practice
- Exception: Hybrid claims (free exercise + another fundamental right); targeted anti-religious laws
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014): RFRA requires strict scrutiny (least restrictive means) when neutral law substantially burdens closely held corporation’s religious exercise
XII. Second Amendment
- Individual right to bear arms for self-defense (District of Columbia v. Heller)
- Incorporated against states (McDonald v. Chicago)
- Limitations: unusual weapons may be regulated; time, place, and manner restrictions OK
- Standard: intermediate-ish scrutiny for restrictions on commonly-used weapons
Key Doctrines
- Marbury v. Madison
- Commerce Clause
- Printz v. United States
- Dormant Commerce Clause
- Youngstown Jackson Tripartite Framework
- Carolene Products Footnote 4
- Strict Scrutiny
- Intermediate Scrutiny
- Brandenburg v. Ohio
- Lemon Test (Establishment Clause)
- Employment Division v. Smith
- SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
Key Cases
- Marbury v. Madison — establishes judicial review of acts of Congress
- McCulloch v. Maryland — implied powers; N&P Clause; outline not a blueprint
- United States v. Lopez — revives categorical approach to Commerce Clause; VAWA invalid (Morrison)
- Gonzales v. Raich — local medicinal marijuana = substantial aggregate effect on interstate market
- NFIB v. Sebelius — individual mandate = tax; Medicaid expansion = coercive spending
- South Dakota v. Dole — spending conditions OK if not coercive; conditions must be germane
- Printz v. United States — anti-commandeering; states cannot be ordered to enforce federal law
- New York v. United States — federal gov’t cannot compel states to enact federal regulatory program
- INS v. Chadha — legislative veto violates bicameralism and presentment
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer — Jackson’s tripartite framework for presidential power
- Brown v. Board of Education — de jure racial segregation in schools violates Equal Protection
- Korematsu v. United States — Japanese internment; demonstrates limits of strict scrutiny in wartime
- Washington v. Davis — discriminatory impact alone insufficient; must show discriminatory intent
- Grutter v. Bollinger — diversity in higher education is compelling interest; individualized review required
- Lochner v. New York — liberty of contract; overruled by West Coast Hotel; cautionary tale for substantive DP
- Brandenburg v. Ohio — modern free speech test: intent + imminence + likelihood
- Citizens United v. FEC — corporate independent expenditures = protected speech; anti-distortion interest insufficient
- Employment Division v. Smith — neutral laws of general applicability don’t violate Free Exercise
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc — RFRA requires least-restrictive-means test for corporate religious exercise
- District of Columbia v. Heller — Second Amendment protects individual right to bear arms for self-defense
Exam Approach
1. Federalism / Commerce Clause
- Is this a channel, instrumentality, or activity substantially affecting interstate commerce?
- Is the regulated activity economic? Jurisdictional element?
- Taxing power: revenue-generating, pigovian, not a penalty?
- Spending: conditions unambiguous, germane, not coercive (Sebelius all-or-nothing problem)?
- Anti-commandeering: Is this compelling states to enact/enforce federal law (Printz) or just an incentive (Dole)?
2. Separation of Powers
- Presidential action: which Youngstown zone? Express authority / congressional silence / congressional disapproval?
- Appointment: principal vs. inferior officer?
- Removal: purely executive → removable at will; independent agency quasi-powers → good cause
- Legislative veto, line-item veto → categorically unconstitutional
3. Equal Protection
- What classification? Race → strict scrutiny; sex → intermediate; economic → rational basis
- Discriminatory impact alone insufficient; need discriminatory intent (Washington v. Davis / Arlington Heights)
- Affirmative action: compelling interest (diversity in education OK); quota system = fatal; plus-factor = OK
- Animus principle: bare hostility toward a group fails even rational basis (Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, Windsor)
4. Substantive Due Process
- Fundamental right? Deeply rooted in history and tradition?
- Economic regulation → rational basis (post-Lochner)
- Marriage, abortion, intimate decisions → robust review
5. First Amendment
- Content-based → strict scrutiny; content-neutral → intermediate
- Expressive conduct: is regulation targeting expressive element (strict) or incidental (O’Brien)?
- Establishment: Lemon test; endorsement test; coercion test; ceremonial deism
- Free exercise: neutral law of general applicability → Smith (no violation); targeted at religion → strict scrutiny; RFRA for federal statutes → least restrictive means