Criminal Adjudications

Course Info

Professor: APM Semester: Fall 2013 Source: 2013 Criminal Adjudications Outline


Topics Covered

  • Prosecutorial discretion: charging decisions, selective prosecution, vindictive prosecution
  • Grand jury: role, independence, secrecy, disclosure obligations
  • Preliminary hearings vs. grand juries
  • Right to counsel: federal and state, scope, critical stages
  • Bail and pre-trial detention (8th Amendment; Bail Reform Act of 1984)
  • Right to speedy trial (6th Amendment; Speedy Trial Act of 1974)
  • Discovery: Rule 16, Jencks Act, Brady obligations
  • Disclosure by defense; discovery sanctions
  • Guilty pleas: types, colloquy, voluntariness
  • Plea bargaining: types, constitutionality, policy debates
  • Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums

Detailed Outline

I. Prosecutorial Discretion

General Rule: The decision whether to file a criminal charge, which charges to file, and against whom rests almost exclusively with the prosecutor and is not subject to judicial review.

Bases for non-reviewability:

  1. Separation of powers — prosecution is executive function; courts cannot supervise (Inmates of Attica)
  2. Standing — private citizens have no judicially cognizable interest in prosecution of another (Linda R.S. v. Richard D.)
  3. Judicial competence — courts not suited to evaluate deterrence value, enforcement priorities, case’s relationship to overall enforcement interests (Wayte)

Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978): As long as probable cause exists, the charging decision is wholly within prosecutorial discretion.

Choosing Between Statutes:

  • US v. Batchelder (1979): Prosecutor can choose between overlapping statutes with different maximum penalties. No EPC violation unless discriminatory purpose shown.

Selective Prosecution (Armstrong / Wayte standard):

  • Must show: (1) discriminatory effect — similarly situated individuals of a different class not prosecuted; (2) discriminatory purpose
  • Presumption that prosecutor has not violated EPC; defendant must present clear evidence
  • Discovery catch-22: can’t get files to prove claim without already having made sufficient pleading (Armstrong)

Vindictive Prosecution:

  • Blackledge v. Perry (1974): Presumption of vindictiveness when defendant exercises post-conviction right to new trial and prosecutor then charges more serious offense
  • US v. Goodwin (1982): No presumption at pre-trial stage; defendant bears burden of proving improper motive
  • Policy: encouraging efficiency (not deterring appeals at the point where tactical changes are expected)

II. Grand Jury

Structure and Role:

  • Federal 5th Amendment guarantees grand jury for all federal defendants
  • Not incorporated by 14th Amendment (Hurtado v. California)
  • 23 members traditionally; majority needed to indict; serve up to 18 months
  • Grand jury belongs to no branch of government — in Bill of Rights, not Articles (Williams)
  • Accusatory/investigative; not a criminal proceeding (6th Am. doesn’t apply; DJ doesn’t apply; FRE don’t apply)

Secrecy and Independence:

  • Secret proceedings; no judges, no defendant in most federal proceedings
  • Broad subpoena power; mechanisms to compel testimony (use immunity, transactional immunity)
  • No constitutional requirement that prosecutor disclose exculpatory evidence to GJ (Williams)
  • Low evidentiary threshold: mere probable cause sufficient; hearsay allowed (Costello)

Limits on Judicial Review:

  • Courts rarely dismiss indictments for evidentiary insufficiency (Costello, Williams)
  • Bank of Nova Scotia: GJ errors not grounds for dismissal absent demonstrated prejudice
  • US v. Mechanik: After conviction, GJ error is harmless (challenge moot)
  • Combination of Costello + Bank of Nova Scotia + Mechanik eliminates nearly all challenges to GJ work

Preliminary Hearings vs. Grand Juries:

FeatureGrand JuryPreliminary Hearing
ProcessInquisitorial (ex parte)Adversarial
Decision-makerGJ (lay citizens)Judge
6th Am. counselDoes not applyAttaches (Coleman v. Alabama)
PublicSecretPublic
ResultIndictmentInformation

III. Right to Counsel

Historical Development:

Modern Rule (after Gideon, Argersinger, Scott):

  • Capital crimes: counsel required regardless of circumstances
  • Felonies: counsel required regardless of circumstances (Gideon)
  • Misdemeanors: counsel required only when court actually imposes imprisonment (Scott v. Illinois)
  • Actual imprisonment = any incarceration actually imposed; suspended sentence = imprisonment for this purpose (Alabama v. Shelton)
  • Nichols v. US: No right to counsel for federal misdemeanor charge not resulting in actual imprisonment, even if later used to enhance sentence

Scope — “Critical Stages”:

  • Post-indictment lineups, preliminary hearings, arraignments, plea negotiations, and trial
  • Not: grand jury proceedings, pre-charge investigatory lineups, parole revocation hearings

IV. Bail and Pre-Trial Detention

8th Amendment: “Excessive bail shall not be required” — bail must be reasonably calculated to ensure appearance at trial (Stack v. Boyle)

Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C. § 3142):

  • § 3142(b): Release on own recognizance or unsecured appearance bond
  • § 3142(c): Conditional release (least restrictive conditions ensuring appearance + community safety)
  • § 3142(e): Preventive detention if: (1) danger to community or (2) serious risk of flight; must be shown by clear and convincing evidence at detention hearing
  • § 3142(f): Defendant has right to counsel, right to present evidence, cross-examine at detention hearing
  • § 3142(g): Factors: nature/circumstances of offense, weight of evidence, history/characteristics of defendant, nature/seriousness of danger

US v. Salerno (1987): Preventive detention under BRA does not violate DPC or 8th Am.

  • DPC: Detention is regulatory (not punitive); government’s interest in community safety can outweigh individual liberty
  • 8th Am.: “Excessive bail” clause does not guarantee right to bail at all; court can deny bail for compelling interests beyond flight risk

V. Right to Speedy Trial

6th Amendment Trigger: Right attaches at formal indictment, information, or arrest (not pre-indictment)

  • Pre-indictment delay: 5th Am. DPC (not 6th Am.); investigative delays generally valid even if somewhat prejudicial (Lovasco)
  • Post-indictment, pre-arrest delay: 6th Am. applies (Doggett — 8.5-year delay was violation)

Barker v. Wingo (1972) — Four-Factor Balancing Test:

  1. Length of delay — triggering factor; presumptively prejudicial at 8+ months
  2. Reasons for delay — deliberate delays weigh heavily against government; negligence or overcrowded courts weigh less heavily; missing witnesses neutral
  3. Defendant’s assertion of right — matters at the extremes; defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial
  4. Prejudice to defendant — focuses on: (a) oppressive pretrial incarceration, (b) minimizing anxiety, (c) impairing defense (most important)

Remedy: Dismissal of indictment (with prejudice) — the only remedy for a speedy trial violation.

Vermont v. Brillon (2009): Delays caused by assigned defense counsel’s failures not attributable to the state for speedy trial purposes.

Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (18 U.S.C. § 3161):

  • § 3161(b): Indictment/information must be filed within 30 days of arrest
  • § 3161(c): Trial must commence within 70 days of indictment (minimum 30 days unless defendant consents)
  • § 3161(h): Excludable time (competency proceedings, interlocutory appeals, pre-trial motions, transfers, transportation)
  • Ends of justice continuances: allowed only if outweigh public/defendant interest in speedy trial
  • Sanctions (§ 3162): dismissal with or without prejudice

VI. Discovery and Disclosure

General: Criminal discovery is far more limited than civil; primary concern is witness safety and preventing perjurious defenses.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16:

  • 16(a): Government must disclose to defense (on request): defendant’s statements, prior record, documents/objects, scientific reports, expert information
  • 16(b): Reciprocal; defendant must disclose if government has complied with defense discovery request
  • 16(c): Continuing duty to disclose
  • Work product exception: reports, memos by government attorneys/agents

Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500):

  • After government witness testifies on direct, defendant may request prior statements of that witness
  • Limits pre-trial access to government witness statements (to prevent intimidation)

Constitutional Brady Obligations:

  • Brady v. Maryland (1963): Due process requires government to turn over evidence favorable to accused that is material to guilt or punishment; irrespective of good or bad faith
  • US v. Bagley (1985) — Materiality Standard: Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability (not preponderance) that, had it been disclosed, the result would have been different
  • Kyles v. Whitley (1995): Affirmative duty to disclose known favorable evidence; Brady materiality applied in the aggregate (all suppressed evidence together, not item by item)
  • Agurs (1976): Defense request unnecessary; good/bad faith irrelevant to Brady violation
  • Arizona v. Youngblood (1988): Failure to preserve potentially useful evidence violates DPC only if defendant can show bad faith on part of police
  • Brady includes both exculpatory and impeaching material (Bagley)
  • Connick v. Thompson (2011): DA’s office not liable under § 1983 for failure to train based on single Brady violation

Discovery by Defense:

  • Williams v. Florida (1970): Notice of alibi rules constitutional; accelerates disclosure, doesn’t compel self-incrimination
  • Taylor v. Illinois (1988): Exclusion of testimony is appropriate sanction for willful, blatant defense nondisclosure

VII. Guilty Pleas

Four Types:

  1. Unequivocal guilty plea (FRCP 11) — standard admission of guilt
  2. Conditional plea (FRCP 11(a)(2)) — reserves right to appeal specific legal issue
  3. Alford plea — defendant maintains innocence but pleads guilty; court must find strong factual basis
  4. Nolo contendere — no contest; not admissible in civil proceedings; rarely used

North Carolina v. Alford (1970):

  • Defendant may plead guilty while protesting innocence if there is strong evidence of guilt
  • Admission of guilt is NOT a constitutional prerequisite to imposition of criminal sentence
  • Court must find adequate factual basis before accepting Alford plea

FRCP 11 Colloquy Requirements:

  • Court must address defendant in open court under oath
  • Two goals: (1) ensure informed and intelligent plea; (2) ensure accuracy (defendant is actually guilty)
  • Inform of rights being waived: jury trial, confrontation, self-incrimination, burden of proof
  • Court must determine voluntariness

Brady v. US Standard: A guilty plea is voluntary if it is a “voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action”; pleading to avoid maximum penalty is constitutionally valid.

Waiver by Guilty Plea: Defendant waives right to jury trial, confrontation, against self-incrimination, and many pre-trial rights (Tollett v. Henderson). Collateral attacks generally foreclosed unless:

  1. Charge is one state cannot constitutionally prosecute (Blackledge exception)
  2. Double jeopardy where indictment is facially duplicative (Menna v. NY) — no further factfinding required

Plea Bargaining — Types (FRCP 11(c)):

  • Charge bargaining: dismiss or not bring other charges
  • Sentence bargaining: recommend specific sentence or sentencing range
  • Wired plea: defendant’s plea linked to co-defendant’s fate (Pollard)
  • Release-dismissal agreements: dismiss charges if defendant releases § 1983 claims (Newton v. Rumery — enforceable)

Constitutional Limits:

  • Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Prosecutor can threaten to bring more serious charges if defendant refuses to plead (no DPC violation if probable cause exists)
  • Blackledge v. Perry: Presumption of vindictiveness when new charges filed after defendant exercises post-trial right
  • US v. Ruiz: Government not required to disclose impeachment evidence before guilty plea

Policy Debates:

  • Pro: Judicial economy; reduces workload; gives defendant bargaining opportunity; mutual advantage
  • Con: Unequal bargaining power; possibility of vindictiveness; mandatory minimums give prosecutors outsized leverage; courts rarely depart from sentencing guidelines

VIII. Sentencing

Federal Sentencing Guidelines:

  • Introduced 1987; initially mandatory; US v. Booker (2005): made advisory
  • Courts must calculate guideline range, consider § 3553(a) factors (nature/circumstances of offense, history/characteristics of defendant, purposes of punishment)
  • Mandatory minimums: Congress has authority; triggers prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining

Key Doctrines


Key Cases


Exam Approach

1. Prosecutorial Discretion

  • Charging decision? → Almost unreviewable (Inmates of Attica)
  • Selective prosecution? → Armstrong: discriminatory effect + discriminatory purpose (clear evidence required)
  • Vindictive? → Blackledge: presumption when defendant exercises post-conviction right and new charge added; Goodwin: no presumption at pre-trial stage

2. Grand Jury

  • 5th Am. right to GJ: federal defendants only; not incorporated
  • Evidence rules don’t apply; hearsay OK (Costello)
  • No duty to present exculpatory evidence (Williams)
  • Court will not dismiss for insufficient evidence absent prejudice (Bank of Nova Scotia)

3. Right to Counsel

  • Federal felony → always; State felony → always (Gideon)
  • Misdemeanor → only if actual imprisonment imposed (Scott); suspended sentence counts (Shelton)
  • Critical stage? → post-indictment, but not GJ proceedings

4. Bail

  • Purpose = ensuring appearance at trial (Stack)
  • BRA 3142(e): preventive detention if flight risk or danger to community — clear and convincing evidence required (Salerno)
  • 8th Am. does not guarantee right to bail at all

5. Speedy Trial

  • 6th Am.: triggered by indictment, information, or arrest
  • Barker four-factor balancing: length → reasons → assertion → prejudice
  • Most delays involving inadequate counsel or overcrowded courts → defendant usually loses (Brillon)
  • Speedy Trial Act: 30 days to indictment; 70 days to trial; excludable delays carefully defined

6. Brady/Discovery

  • Brady requires disclosure of: (1) favorable (exculpatory + impeaching) AND (2) material evidence
  • Materiality = reasonable probability of different outcome if disclosed (Bagley)
  • Assess all undisclosed evidence in aggregate, not item by item (Kyles)
  • Failure to preserve = DPC violation only if bad faith (Youngblood)
  • Rule 16 is baseline; Jencks material available post-testimony; Brady is constitutional floor

7. Guilty Pleas

  • Voluntariness: intelligent choice among alternatives; pleading to avoid max penalty = OK (Brady v. US)
  • Alford plea: strong factual basis required; admission of guilt not required
  • What’s waived: jury, confrontation, self-incrimination, most pre-trial rights
  • Collateral attack: very limited — only where government lacks power to prosecute or facially duplicative indictment
  • Plea bargaining: constitutional despite power imbalance (Bordenkircher); vindictiveness exception (Blackledge)