Newton v. Rumery
Citation
480 U.S. 386 (1987). Supreme Court of the United States.
Facts
Bernard Rumery was arrested on a charge of witness tampering. Prosecutors offered to drop the charge if Rumery would sign a release-dismissal agreement — promising not to bring a civil rights (§ 1983) suit against the arresting officers. Rumery, who had retained counsel, signed. After the charges were dropped, he filed the § 1983 suit and argued the agreement was unenforceable as against public policy.
Issue
Are release-dismissal agreements — in which criminal defendants agree not to sue police officers in exchange for dismissal of charges — per se unenforceable as against public policy, or must courts examine their validity on a case-by-case basis?
Holding
A plurality of the Court held that release-dismissal agreements are not per se unenforceable. Courts must examine the totality of circumstances to determine whether a specific agreement was voluntary, knowing, and free from prosecutorial overreaching.
Rule / Doctrine
Release-dismissal agreements may be enforceable when: the defendant was represented by counsel; the agreement was voluntary and the product of a knowing and intelligent choice; there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or coercion; and a legitimate prosecutorial interest supported the agreement. Per se invalidity was rejected because defendants may rationally choose civil immunity from § 1983 suits in exchange for dismissal of criminal charges. Courts must look at whether the particular agreement undermines public policy against suppressing civil rights litigation.
Significance
Newton raises ethical issues for defense counsel advising clients on release-dismissal agreements. Defense lawyers must assess whether such agreements are in the client’s genuine interest and whether prosecutorial conduct warrants challenge.