Contracts II
Professor: Hillman (references throughout) / Rachlinski (co-professor) Semester: Spring 2016
Course Info
Contracts II picks up after formation and works through the full lifecycle of a contract: policing the agreement, modifying it, interpreting and filling gaps, performance and breach, excusing performance, and the rights of third parties. The course uses a blend of Restatement (Second) doctrine, UCC Article 2, and law-and-economics policy analysis. Hillman and Rachlinski offer competing methodological frameworks throughout — objective reasonableness vs. subjective intent, Williston formalism vs. Corbin contextualism.
The course opens with a two-question framing: (1) what is the economic/business context of the transaction? and (2) what are the equities and motivations of each party?
Topics Covered
- Duress: physical, economic; improper threat; reasonable alternatives; returns exceeding competitive market
- Undue influence: elements and relationship to duress
- Innocent, negligent, and fraudulent misrepresentation; fraudulent concealment; duty to disclose
- Public policy limitations: exculpatory clauses (Rest. 2d § 195), covenants not to compete (Rest. 2d § 188)
- Constructive fraud and equity doctrines
- Unconscionability: procedural and substantive (UCC § 2-302); Ryan v. Weiner; Industralease; Jones v. Star Credit
- Standard form contracts: shrinkwrap, browsewrap, clickwrap; Rest. 2d § 211 reasonable expectation doctrine
- Modifications: preexisting duty rule; Rest. 2d § 89 (executory contracts); UCC § 2-209
- Accord and satisfaction; UCC § 3-311 negotiable instruments
- Parol evidence rule: Williston vs. Corbin approaches; collateral agreement exception; ambiguity exception
- Rules of contract interpretation: objective, subjective, and purposive; Rest. 2d §§ 201–202
- Trade usage, course of dealing, course of performance (UCC §§ 1-303, 2-202)
- Gap filling: intent-based and fairness-based; UCC default terms
- Good faith obligations; employment at will; Fortune v. NCR; Tymshare v. Covell
- Conditions: express, implied, promissory, non-promissory, precedent, subsequent
- Jacob & Youngs three-factor test: purpose, excuse for deviation, balance of hardships
- Satisfaction clauses: objective (commercial fitness) vs. subjective (taste/judgment)
- Avoiding express conditions: impossibility, waiver, equitable excuse (Rest. 2d § 229)
- Order of performance: simultaneous exchange; sequential performance; installment contracts
- Quality of performance: substantial performance vs. material breach; Rest. 2d § 241
- Anticipatory repudiation: clear statement or voluntary disabling act; Rest. 2d § 250
- Adequate assurance of performance: Rest. 2d § 251; UCC § 2-609
- Mutual mistake: Rest. 2d §§ 152, 154; risk allocation; Sherwood v. Walker
- Unilateral mistake: Rest. 2d § 153; unconscionability or other party’s fault
- Impossibility: Taylor v. Caldwell; implied condition of continued existence; Rest. 2d § 263
- Impracticability: Rest. 2d § 261; substantial change in cost; risk not allocated
- Frustration of purpose: Krell v. Henry; foundational purpose; not in reasonable contemplation
- Third-party beneficiaries: creditor and donee; intended vs. incidental; privity problems; Rest. §§ 309, 311
- UCC extensions of warranty privity: §§ 2-318, 2-313A, 2-313B
- Assignment of rights; delegation of duties; personal services exception; material change limitation
- Novation vs. assignment vs. substituted contract
Detailed Outline
I. Policing Agreements
A. Duress (Rest. 2d § 175)
- Deliberate exploitation / improper threat (Rest. 2d § 176): threat of tort, crime, or action not privileged; threat to breach preexisting duty
- Returns exceed those normally realizable in a competitive market (e.g., 200% of market value)
- Lack of reasonable alternative — courts split between objective and subjective tests
- Economic duress: courts reluctant to interfere with market-based exchanges; scrutinize monopolistic pricing and exploitation of a party’s particular situation
- Preexisting duty rule: under CL, prior duty bars modification; UCC § 2-209(1) allows good-faith modifications without additional consideration
- Key cases: S.P. Dunham & Co. v. Kudra; Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico (hold-up vs. unanticipated circumstances story)
B. Undue Influence
Elements: unusual time/place; insistent demand; emphasis on consequences of delay; multiple persuaders; absence of third-party advisers to servient party
C. Misrepresentation
- Innocent, negligent, fraudulent: falsity + knowledge level + intent to induce + reasonable reliance + materiality + damages
- Remedies scale from rescission/reliance (innocent) to benefit-of-the-bargain + punitives (fraudulent)
- Effect of disclaimers: cannot disclaim fraud or negligent misrepresentation that induced entry into contract
- Fraudulent concealment / duty to disclose: material latent fact + knowledge + not within diligent attention of other party + suppression + reasonable reliance + damage
- Partial disclosures may be fraud; caveat emptor relaxed by courts; Kronman’s allocative efficiency argument for nondisclosure of deliberately produced information
D. Public Policy
- Illegal contracts: state criminal law policy trumps freedom of contract
- Exculpatory clauses: Rest. 2d § 195(2)(b) — party charged with public duty cannot disclaim negligence liability; ski-jump hypo distinguishes voluntary assumption of inherent risk
- Covenants not to compete (Rest. 2d § 188): valid only if (1) protects legitimate interest narrowly, (2) does not deprive person of reasonable livelihood, (3) does not unreasonably restrain trade; Dwyer v. Jung; Karpinski v. Ingrasci
- Constructive fraud in equity: confidential relationship + reliance + inadequate price; Jackson v. Seymour
E. Unconscionability (UCC § 2-302; Rest. 2d § 208)
- Procedural: defect in bargaining process — pressure, lack of comprehension, rushed transaction
- Substantive: one-sided terms, overly burdensome outcome
- Both elements generally required; more of each makes unconscionability more likely
- Cases: Ryan v. Weiner (rushed transaction, uneducated alcoholic); Industralease (rushed disclaimer, incinerators that do not function); Jones v. Star Credit (900 with hidden interest)
- Standard form contracts: Rest. 2d § 211 reasonable expectation doctrine; C&J Fertilizer (unexpected exclusion in definition section, not exclusions section); Caspi v. Microsoft; Specht v. Netscape
II. Modifications and Settlement
A. Preexisting Duty Rule and Modifications
- Common law: fiction of mutual rescission; token consideration satisfies rule but manipulable
- Rest. 2d § 89: executory contract modification enforceable if (a) fair and equitable + (b) unanticipated circumstances + (c) or material change from justified reliance
- UCC § 2-209(1): good-faith modification without additional consideration; § 2-209(2) no-oral-modification clauses
- Cases: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico; Schwartzreich v. Baum-Basch; Angel v. Murray (§ 89 applied to trash-collection modification for population growth); Flowers v. Diamond Shamrock
B. Accord and Satisfaction (UCC § 3-311)
- Elements: genuine dispute + voluntary agreement to settle
- UCC § 3-311: good faith instrument + unliquidated or bona fide disputed claim + claimant obtains payment; discharged unless claimant set up dispute-settlement mechanism (§ 3-311(c)(1)) or repays within 90 days (§ 3-311(c)(2))
- Cases: ConEdison v. Arroll (instrument sent to billing, not complaints department)
- Accord vs. substituted contract: accord extinguished only on satisfaction; substituted contract rescinds original immediately
III. Performance: Interpretation and Gap Filling
A. Parol Evidence Rule
- Rule: writing is privileged means of determining parties’ intent; parol (extrinsic) evidence inadmissible or disfavored
- Williston: strong preference for writing; exclude PE unless contract facially incomplete
- Corbin: admit PE, trust juries to weigh; “clear and convincing” standard
- Exceptions outside the rule: fraud, duress, mistake (go to enforceability, not interpretation)
- Exceptions within the rule: collateral agreement (Rest. 2d §§ 209–210 — three Mitchill v. Lath elements: collateral in nature, does not contradict express/implied terms, kind parties would not normally write down); ambiguity (PG&E v. Thomas Drayage; genuine ambiguity required)
- UCC § 2-202: trade usage/course of dealing/performance admissible without threshold ambiguity finding unless full integration
B. Rules of Interpretation
- Objective: reasonable person standard; Rest. 2d § 201(1) shared meaning controls
- Subjective exception: where one party had reason to know of other’s different meaning, culpable party bound to other’s meaning (Rest. 2d § 201(2))
- Both parties unaware of divergence and neither has reason to know: no contract, void for ambiguity (Raffles v. Wichelhaus rule; Rest. 2d § 201(3))
- Trade usage > course of dealing > course of performance < express terms (UCC § 1-303 hierarchy)
- Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co.: two prior price-protection incidents = course of performance + trade usage overrides “posted price at time of delivery”
C. Gap Filling
- Intent-based (what the parties would have wanted) vs. fairness-based (what is reasonable at the time of dispute)
- Penalty default: Hadley foreseeability rule incentivizes information-sharing
- Good faith constrains discretionary terms (Fortune v. NCR; Tymshare v. Covell); some states (TX) reject implied good faith in employment — City of Midland v. O’Bryant
- UCC defaults: price (§ 2-305), time (§ 2-309), payment (§ 2-310), installments (§ 2-307)
- Cases: Haines v. City of New York (duration gap filled by intent of mutual benefit); Haslund (vesting gap for equity); Southwest Engineering Co. v. Martin Tractor Co. (payment structure gap filled by UCC § 2-310)
IV. Conditions and Breach
A. Conditions vs. Promises
- Condition: if condition fails, contingent obligation does not mature; failure can lead to forfeiture
- Promise: breach leads to damages but does not relieve other party of obligation
- Jacob & Youngs three-factor test (key to the whole course):
- Purpose of the term — what desire is to be satisfied?
- Excuse for deviation — intentional vs. innocent/negligent?
- Balance of hardships — cruelty of enforced adherence vs. harm to non-breaching party
- Default: courts prefer to read ambiguous terms as promises (Rest. 2d § 261), not conditions, to avoid forfeiture
- Rest. 2d § 229: court may excuse non-occurrence of condition if it would cause disproportionate forfeiture, unless the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange
- Cases: Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent; Meritt Hill Vineyards; Brown-Marx v. Emigrant Savings; Gibson v. Cranage (satisfaction clause); JNA Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea; Holiday Inn v. Knight
B. Order of Performance
- Simultaneous exchange as default (UCC §§ 2-507, 2-511; Rest. 2d § 234)
- Sequential performance when one performance requires a period of time
- Owner typically better debtor; builder/employee typically better creditor
- Cases: Stewart v. Newbury (builder must complete before payment unless contract says otherwise); K&G Construction Co. v. Harris
C. Quality of Performance / Material Breach
- Rest. 2d § 241: (1) purpose of contract frustrated? (2) deviation intentional? (3) hardship on deficient party?
- Dependent vs. independent obligations; opportunity to cure (Rest. 2d § 242)
- Cases: Plante v. Jacobs (misplaced wall — moved in, no market value loss → substantial performance); OW Grun Roofing Co. v. Cope (streaky roof — subjective purpose was attractiveness)
D. Anticipatory Repudiation
- Rest. 2d § 250: clear statement of nonperformance OR voluntary disabling act
- Consequences: aggrieved party may (a) await performance, (b) resort to other remedies, (c) suspend own performance (UCC § 2-610)
- Adequate assurance: Rest. 2d § 251; UCC § 2-609 — written demand; failure to provide within reasonable time (not exceeding 30 days) = repudiation
- Cases: Hoechster v. De La Tour; Walker & Co. v. Harrison; K&G Construction; Magnet Resources Inc. v. Summit; Greghuhn v. Omaha Insurance
V. Excusing Performance
A. Mutual Mistake (Rest. 2d §§ 152, 154)
- Elements: (1) both parties mistaken; (2) basic assumption on which contract made; (3) material effect; (4) risk not allocated to adversely affected party
- Risk allocation (§ 154): agreement of parties; aware of limited knowledge and treats it as sufficient (knowing gamble); court finds it reasonable
- Cases: Sherwood v. Walker (barren vs. breeding cow — different thing entirely); Wood v. Boynton (found rock — speculative transaction, knowing risk allocation); Lenawee Co. v. Messerly (“as is” clause allocates risk of discoverable defects, not unknown material defects)
B. Unilateral Mistake (Rest. 2d § 153)
- Enforcement unconscionable OR other party had reason to know of mistake or caused it
- Public contract bids: Triple A Contractors v. Rural Waters; Donovan v. RRL Corp. (Jaguar ad)
C. Impossibility and Impracticability
- Impossibility: supervening destruction of something necessary for performance that was basic assumption; Taylor v. Caldwell (music hall burns — implied condition of continued existence)
- Impracticability (Rest. 2d § 261): substantial change; non-occurrence was a basic assumption; risk not allocated by contract
- Test: not just higher cost; must be extraordinary change AND unforeseeable AND risk unallocated
- Cases: Taylor v. Caldwell; Canadian Industrial Alcohol v. Dunbar Molasses (at-fault interference with supply); Transatlantic Financing (Suez Canal — fixed-price = freighter bears route risk); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard (gravel at 10x cost = impracticable); Mishara Construction (labor dispute — within party’s control)
- Force majeure clauses as explicit allocation device
D. Frustration of Purpose
- Elements: (1) foundational purpose of the contract; (2) purpose frustrated; (3) not in reasonable contemplation of parties when contract formed; (4) risk not allocated
- Distinguished from impracticability: performance still possible; it is the benefit expected that vanishes
- Cases: Krell v. Henry (coronation procession — high premium paid, symmetrical foundational purpose); Lloyd v. Murphy (wartime new-car lease — risk of government regulation allocated to tenant; landlord modified lease)
VI. Third-Party Beneficiaries
- Creditor beneficiary: prior debt + contract to pay it; Lawrence v. Fox
- Donee beneficiary: contract intends to create gift to third party; Seaver v. Ransom
- Intended vs. incidental (key distinction): objective reasonableness (Hillman) vs. subjective intent (Rachlinski); must assess whether parties truly meant to subject obligor to suit by beneficiary
- H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co. (no intent to create cause of action in general public)
- Defenses against beneficiary (Rest. § 309): voidable formation; policing doctrines; generally no other defenses unless arises from beneficiary’s own conduct (§ 309(4))
- Modification / discharge (Rest. § 311): parties can modify until beneficiary materially changes position in reliance, sues, or manifests assent
- UCC: § 2-318 (Alt A, B, C — extends warranties to family members, foreseeable individuals, any foreseeable victim); §§ 2-313A, 2-313B (extending privity through intermediaries and advertising)
- Cases: Lawrence v. Fox; Alaniz v. Schal; Morestain v. Kircher (novating promisor back); Rouse v. U.S. (improper-installation defense unavailable because promise was to pay, not to discharge whatever liability promisee is under)
VII. Assignment and Delegation
- Assignment of rights: default rule is assignable unless material change in contract (Rest. 2d § 317(2)(a)) or personal services exception
- Delegation of duties: may be prohibited by personal services character of obligation
- Material change test: Crane Ice Cream v. Terminal Freezing (variable ice contract — Crane bigger, arbitrage risk); Macke v. Pizza of Gaithersburg (not personal services — Macke liable for VA Coffee obligations)
- Default: assign the rights, not delegate the duties unless express or implied
- Novation: complete replacement; all parties must agree; original obligor discharged; Utica case
- Defenses by obligor against assignee (Rest. § 336): only those that accrued before notice of assignment; and impossibility/illegality/non-occurrence/failure of performance afterwards
Key Doctrines
- Duress
- Promissory Estoppel
- Statute of Frauds
- Preexisting Duty Rule
- Parol Evidence Rule
- Substantial Performance
- UCC Article 2
- Expectation Damages
- Consequential Damages
- Mitigation of Damages
- Liquidated Damages
- Specific Performance
Key Cases
- Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent — three-factor test: purpose, excuse, balance of hardships; promise vs. condition distinction
- Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co. — course of performance and trade usage to add price-protection term
- Krell v. Henry — frustration of purpose; foundational purpose of both parties must be frustrated
- Taylor v. Caldwell — impossibility from supervening destruction; implied condition of continued existence
- Sherwood v. Walker — mutual mistake; barren vs. breeding cow is a fundamentally different thing
- Hoechster v. De La Tour — anticipatory repudiation; breach occurs at repudiation, not at date of performance
- Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico — preexisting duty rule; hold-up vs. unanticipated circumstances
- Lawrence v. Fox — third-party creditor beneficiary has standing to sue promisor
- Angel v. Murray — Rest. 2d § 89 modification for unanticipated circumstances (population growth)
- Walker & Co. v. Harrison — premature repudiation by dry cleaner when sign co. at most partially breached
- Britton v. Turner — breaching party may recover in quasi-contract for value conferred before material breach
- Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil — specific performance available where output contract is indefinite and cover is unavailable
- Truck Rent-a-Center v. Puritan Farms — liquidated damages valid if reasonable forecast and actual damages hard to estimate
- Clark v. Marsiglia — duty to mitigate; cannot continue performance after anticipatory repudiation if that increases damages
- Parker v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp. — mitigation; different and inferior employment not adequate substitute
- Sparks v. Gustafson — restitution/quasi-contract for improvements to property of another
- Watts v. Watts — unjust enrichment recovery for cohabiting partners
- Wheeler v. White — promissory estoppel as reliance-based substitute for consideration in contract formation
- McIntosh v. Murphy — promissory estoppel removes Statute of Frauds bar
Exam Approach
1. Policing the Agreement
- Duress? → (1) improper threat, (2) returns exceed competitive market, (3) no reasonable alternative
- Undue influence? → unusual circumstances + multiple persuaders + no advisers
- Misrepresentation? → falsity + knowledge level + intent + reliance + materiality + damages; can disclaimer block?
- Fraudulent concealment? → material latent defect + knowledge + not in other party’s diligent reach
- Constructive fraud / equity? → confidential relationship + reliance + grossly inadequate price
- Public policy? → exculpatory clause (public duty? gross negligence?); non-compete (legitimate interest? narrowly tailored? livelihood?)
- Unconscionability? → procedural defect in bargaining + substantively one-sided outcome; both generally required
2. Modification Issues
- Preexisting duty bar? → common law friction of mutual rescission; token consideration satisfies but is manipulable
- Rest. 2d § 89: (a) fair and equitable + (b) unanticipated circumstances, or (c) reliance?
- UCC § 2-209: good-faith modification without consideration; no-oral-modification clause still modifiable by conduct?
- Accord and satisfaction: genuine dispute + voluntary agreement; UCC § 3-311 dispute-settlement mechanism
3. Interpretation and Gap Filling
- Parol evidence rule: integrated writing? Full or partial integration?
- Collateral agreement? (Mitchill three-part test)
- Ambiguity? → limited version or broad Corbin approach?
- Rest. 2d § 201 shared meaning / reason to know / mutual misunderstanding
- Trade usage, course of dealing, course of performance hierarchy (UCC § 1-303)
- UCC gap-fillers; good faith constraint on discretionary terms
4. Conditions and Breach
- Express condition or implied promise? → Apply Jacob & Youngs three-factor test: purpose, excuse, balance of hardships
- Substantial performance or material breach? (Rest. 2d § 241)
- Order of performance: simultaneous exchange or sequential? Who is the better debtor/creditor?
- Waiver of condition? (course of conduct; retractable absent reliance)
- Equitable excuse of forfeiture? (Rest. 2d § 229 — disproportionate forfeiture + condition not material part of exchange)
- Anticipatory repudiation: clear statement or voluntary disabling act (Rest. 2d § 250)?
- Adequate assurance: reasonable grounds for insecurity → written demand → 30-day clock (UCC § 2-609; Rest. 2d § 251)
5. Excusing Performance
- Mutual mistake? → basic assumption + material + risk not allocated (§§ 152, 154)
- Unilateral mistake? → unconscionable to enforce OR other party knew/caused
- Impossibility? → supervening destruction + basic assumption + no fault + risk unallocated (Rest. 2d § 263)
- Impracticability? → substantial change + basic assumption + non-occurrence + risk unallocated (Rest. 2d § 261)
- Frustration of purpose? → foundational purpose of both parties + purpose completely frustrated + not reasonably foreseeable + risk unallocated
- Force majeure clause? → explicit allocation; check scope
6. Third-Party Beneficiaries and Assignment
- Intended vs. incidental beneficiary? → objective or subjective intent of parties
- Creditor vs. donee? → helps assess but intent-vs.-incidental distinction controls
- What defenses can promisor assert against beneficiary? (Rest. § 309; defects in formation, policing doctrines, beneficiary’s own conduct)
- Can parties modify or discharge? (Rest. § 311 — not after beneficiary relies, sues, or assents)
- Assignment: does it materially change the contract? Personal services exception?
- Delegation: separate from assignment of rights; default is duties are delegated with assignment unless personal services
- Novation: requires all parties’ agreement; original obligor fully discharged