Tedla v. Ellman
Citation: 280 N.Y. 124 (1939)
Facts
Tedla and her brother walked along the right side of a highway (contrary to a statute requiring pedestrians to walk on the left, facing traffic), because there was heavy traffic on the left and lighter traffic on the right. They were struck by defendant’s negligently driven car.
Issue
Does violation of a pedestrian traffic statute constitute negligence per se when there is a reason to believe compliance would have been more dangerous?
Holding
No, not in these circumstances. When a safety statute’s violation occurred because compliance would have exposed the plaintiff to greater danger, and the violation was the safer course, the violation does not constitute negligence per se. The statute should be construed to require safe conduct, not dangerous compliance.
Rule
Exception to negligence per se: A statutory violation is not negligence per se if: (1) compliance with the statute would have been more dangerous than violation under the circumstances, AND (2) the actor took reasonable precautions that the statute was designed to encourage. The purpose of the statute is to make pedestrians safer; compliance that would make them less safe defeats that purpose.
Significance
- Important qualification on Martin v. Herzog’s strict negligence per se rule
- Introduces a purpose-based analysis: violation of a safety statute is not automatically negligence per se if the violation was itself the safer course in the circumstances
- Consistent with the Restatement approach: statutory violation is evidence of negligence (or negligence per se) only when the harm resulted from the hazard the statute was designed to prevent
- Still negligence per se if compliance was possible and reasonable