Keeble v. Hickeringill
Citation and Court
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (QB 1707)
Facts
Keeble owned a duck decoy pond on his land, which he operated as a commercial enterprise to catch ducks for market. His neighbor Hickeringill, acting out of malice and with no legitimate purpose, repeatedly fired guns near the pond to frighten away ducks and disrupt Keeble’s trade. Keeble brought suit for damages.
Issue
Does a person have a legally protected right against a neighbor’s malicious interference with the productive use of one’s land, even without an actual trespass?
Holding
Yes. The Queen’s Bench held in favor of Keeble, finding that Hickeringill’s malicious interference with Keeble’s lawful trade was actionable even though no trespass occurred.
Rule / Doctrine
A person who makes productive use of their land (here, operating a duck decoy) has a legally cognizable interest that is protected against malicious interference by others. While a competitor who also set up a duck decoy would not be liable (lawful competition is protected), one who interferes purely maliciously and without any legitimate purpose is liable for the resulting harm. Malice is the distinguishing factor: lawful competition injures without liability, but malicious injury without legitimate purpose is actionable.
Significance
Keeble v. Hickeringill is an early and foundational case in property and tort law addressing the line between lawful competition and tortious interference. It is notable for distinguishing between harm caused by lawful competitive activity (which is not compensable) and harm caused by purely malicious conduct (which is). The case anticipates modern economic tort law and the doctrine of intentional interference with business relations, and is often read alongside cases on the labor injunction and competitive harm.