Kastigar v. United States
Citation: 406 U.S. 441 (1972)
Facts
Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury. The government granted them immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (use and derivative use immunity), but they refused to testify, claiming the immunity was insufficient to displace their Fifth Amendment privilege.
Issue
Does use and derivative use immunity provide protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, such that compelled testimony under such immunity does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause?
Holding
Yes. Use and derivative use immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege and thus is sufficient to compel testimony. Transactional immunity (immunity from prosecution for any crime related to the compelled testimony) is not constitutionally required.
Rule
Use and derivative use immunity (18 U.S.C. § 6002): the government may compel testimony by granting immunity from the use of that testimony (and any evidence derived from it) against the witness in a criminal prosecution. The government bears the burden of proving that any subsequent prosecution is based on evidence from sources wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
Significance
- Established that use/derivative use immunity is sufficient — transactional immunity is not constitutionally mandated
- Once a witness testifies under immunity, the government bears a heavy burden in any subsequent prosecution to show its evidence is truly independent (United States v. North — Iran-Contra; prosecution dismissed because independent sources were tainted)
- United States v. Hubbell (2000) narrowed application: testimony that revealed the existence and location of documents was itself testimonial; its use or derivative use was barred