Garratt v. Dailey
Citation: 46 Wn.2d 197 (1955)
Facts
Brian Dailey, a five-year-old boy, pulled a chair out from under Ruth Garratt as she was sitting down (or moved it to where she intended to sit). Garratt fell and broke her hip. The question was whether Brian had the requisite intent for battery.
Issue
What mental state is required for battery — must the defendant intend to harm the plaintiff, or only intend the act that causes contact?
Holding
The trial court found Brian lacked intent to harm but remanded to determine whether Brian knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would fall. Battery does not require intent to harm; it requires intent to cause the offensive contact or substantial certainty that such contact will result.
Rule
Battery intent — substantial certainty: The intent required for battery is not the intent to harm or injure; it is the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or substantial certainty that such contact (or an act bringing it about) will result. This is called “the dual-intent standard” in some formulations.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A: Intent includes both desire to bring about the consequence AND knowledge with substantial certainty that the consequence will result.
Significance
- Foundational case for the intent element of intentional torts
- Established that “intent” in tort law means desire OR substantial certainty — not limited to malice or purpose to harm
- Children can be liable for intentional torts if they have the requisite intent (unlike the general rule for negligence)
- Used throughout intentional tort analysis: battery, assault, trespass, conversion