Dillon v. Legg
Citation and Court
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (Cal. 1968)
Facts
Margery Dillon witnessed a negligent driver strike and kill her young daughter Erin in the street. Margery was nearby but outside the traditional “zone of danger” — she was not herself in danger of being struck. She suffered serious emotional distress and sought to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). Her other daughter, who was also present, was within the zone of danger and had a clearly recognized claim.
Issue
May a plaintiff recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander who witnesses injury to a close family member but is outside the physical zone of danger?
Holding
Yes. The California Supreme Court held that zone-of-danger was not the correct limiting principle and instead adopted a foreseeability-based test for bystander NIED recovery.
Rule / Doctrine
Bystander NIED recovery is governed by a foreseeability analysis. Courts consider three factors to determine whether emotional distress was a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s negligence: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident (proximity); (2) whether the shock resulted from direct emotional impact from contemporaneous sensory observation of the accident (perception); and (3) whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related (relationship). These factors guide but do not rigidly define foreseeability.
Significance
Dillon v. Legg is a landmark tort law case that expanded bystander NIED recovery beyond the restrictive zone-of-danger rule. The case replaced a categorical rule with a multi-factor foreseeability analysis, which itself was later refined and made more rigid by the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa (1989). Dillon is a central case in the development of American NIED doctrine and illustrates the California court’s willingness to use foreseeability as the primary limiting principle for duty.