Davies v. Mann
Citation and Court
Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Exch. 1842)
Facts
Mann fettered (tied together) the legs of his donkey and left it on a public highway, where it was free to graze but could not move quickly out of the way of traffic. Davies drove his wagon along the road at an undue speed and ran over the donkey, killing it. At trial the court found both that Mann was negligent in leaving the donkey fettered on the road and that Davies drove negligently at too fast a pace.
Issue
Does a plaintiff’s contributory negligence completely bar recovery if the defendant, who had the last opportunity to avoid the accident, failed to do so?
Holding
No. The Court of Exchequer held for Davies (the plaintiff), finding that even though Mann was contributorily negligent, Davies’s failure to use reasonable care to avoid running over the clearly visible donkey was the proximate cause of the harm.
Rule / Doctrine
The “last clear chance” doctrine (also called the “humanitarian doctrine”): a plaintiff’s contributory negligence does not bar recovery if the defendant had the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm and failed to exercise reasonable care to do so. The defendant’s subsequent negligence supersedes the plaintiff’s prior contributory negligence and makes the defendant the proximate cause of the injury.
Significance
Davies v. Mann is the foundational case establishing the last clear chance doctrine, which served as a significant equitable mitigation of the harsh common law rule that any contributory negligence by the plaintiff completely barred recovery. The doctrine was influential in Anglo-American tort law for over a century and is now largely replaced in the United States by comparative negligence systems, which more directly apportion fault. The case is taught as a historical bridge between strict contributory negligence and modern comparative fault.