Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.

Citation: 472 U.S. 585 (Supreme Court, 1985)

Facts

Aspen, Colorado had four ski mountains. Three were owned by Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.); one was owned by Aspen Highlands. For years the parties cooperated in an “all-Aspen” ski pass that allowed skiers to use all four mountains, with revenues split based on usage. Ski Co. ultimately refused to continue the joint pass arrangement and refused to sell Highlands daily tickets at retail prices, effectively excluding Highlands from the all-mountain pass market. Highlands’ business suffered severely.

Issue

Whether a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor — specifically, terminating a prior course of dealing — constitutes unlawful monopolization under Sherman Act § 2.

Holding

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed liability, holding that Ski Co.’s refusal to deal with Highlands was anticompetitive conduct that contributed to unlawful monopolization. The termination of a prior profitable course of dealing, without legitimate business justification, evidenced exclusionary intent.

Rule

A monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor can violate § 2 when the monopolist terminates a prior, voluntary, and presumably profitable course of dealing with no legitimate business justification. The key evidence is that the monopolist sacrificed short-term profits in a way that makes sense only if it was trying to exclude competition. This is one of the narrow circumstances where § 2 imposes an affirmative duty to deal.

Significance

Aspen Skiing is the Supreme Court’s most significant recognition that refusal to deal can be unlawful monopolization — a counterpoint to the general rule that firms have no duty to deal with competitors (Trinko). The case is defined by two features: the existence of a prior profitable relationship (which Ski Co. abandoned) and Ski Co.’s refusal even to sell Highlands tickets at retail price. Post-Trinko, Aspen Skiing is often read narrowly, but it remains the primary precedent for refusal-to-deal claims and essential facilities arguments.

Covered In