Arizona v. Mauro
Citation and Court
481 U.S. 520 (1987) — Supreme Court of the United States
Facts
William Mauro was arrested for killing his son and was given Miranda warnings. He invoked his right to counsel. His wife then arrived at the police station and insisted on speaking with him. An officer allowed the meeting but required a tape recorder be present and openly recorded the conversation. Mauro made incriminating statements during the meeting with his wife. He sought to suppress these statements as obtained in violation of his invocation of the right to counsel.
Issue
Does allowing a suspect who has invoked counsel to meet with his wife in the presence of a police officer with an openly visible tape recorder constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes?
Holding
No; allowing the meeting under those circumstances did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent, because the police did not engage in any express questioning or conduct they should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Rule / Doctrine
Miranda’s prohibition on interrogation after invocation of counsel covers express questioning and its functional equivalent—conduct that police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Merely allowing a suspect to speak with his spouse in the presence of an officer with a recorder does not constitute interrogation if there is no evidence police planned to use the meeting to extract a confession.
Significance
Mauro defines the outer boundary of the “functional equivalent of interrogation” concept from Rhode Island v. Innis, holding that not every action by police that results in a statement constitutes interrogation. It protects officers who allow third-party contacts from being charged with covert interrogation, unless they exploit those contacts to elicit confessions.